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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Billy Joe Gerst appeals from the judgment of conviction for felony DUI. He
challenges the district court’s order partially denying his motion in limine to exclude
evidence of a prior conviction.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2017 Gerst was charged with felony DUI. (R., pp.36-37.) The charge was
predicated on Gerst’s two prior DUI convictions: one charged in 2007, and another
charged in 2013. (R., p.13; PSI pp.6, 8.)
Prior to trial, Gerst filed a motion in limine that sought, among other things, 1 to
prevent the state from introducing evidence of the 2007 DUI. (R., pp.51-52, 64-65, 72114.) Gerst contended that in the 2007 DUI case—where Gerst represented himself—
”[t]here is nothing in the record indicating that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” (R., p.75.) Gerst argued that his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated and therefore sought to preclude “the State
[from] using the 2007 conviction to enhance this case to a felony.” (R., p.79.)
Following a hearing on Gerst’s motion in limine (7/31/17 Tr.), the district court
denied Gerst’s motion to preclude the state from admitting evidence of the 2007 DUI (R.,
pp.119-124). The district court found that Gerst himself either gave testimony of “limited
evidentiary value” or was simply not credible. (R., p.121.) The court further found that

1

Gerst also moved the district court to exclude witnesses and to suppress other evidence
(R., pp.51-52); the district court granted the motion with respect to these requests, and
they are not at issue on appeal. (7/31/17 Tr., p.29, L.6 – p.33, L.7; R., p.119.)
1

the clerk’s record in the 2007 DUI case did not show a “denial of [Gerst’s] right to
counsel”:
To the contrary, it contains an express waiver of that right. On November
27, 2007, Gerst signed a “PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION and ORDER,”
reciting that his agreement to plead guilty was made with full knowledge
of his constitutional rights, which he “WAIVES, including the right to
counsel.” His waiver of the right to counsel is also reflected in paragraph 1
of the judgment of conviction.
(R., p.122 (footnote omitted, citing R., pp.92, 96-97).)
The district court pointed out an error in the judgment (that indicated Gerst’s
rights were “explained by counsel,” which was not possible); and also noted the lack of
audio of a pretrial conference (which, “perhaps,” could have revealed a colloquy between
Gerst and the magistrate about the waiver). (R., p.122, ns.1, 2.) Considering the whole
record of the 2007 DUI case, the district court found it “somewhat troubling” that the
record did not show the magistrate ever “undertook a Faretta 2 inquiry.” (R., p.122.) But
the district court also noted that no such inquiry was required in Idaho; “[c]onsequently,
the absence of evidence that the magistrate undertook a Faretta inquiry doesn’t invalidate
Gerst’s written waiver of the right to counsel.” (R., p.122.)
The district court concluded that “Gerst presented no evidence that he was denied
the right to counsel” in the 2007 DUI case. (R., p.123.) Moreover, “even if [Gerst] can
be said to have presented some evidence,” the district court found “the evidence on the
whole supports the conclusion that he wasn’t denied the right to counsel.” (R,. p.123.)
The district court accordingly partially denied Gerst’s motion in limine to the extent it
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Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2

sought to prevent the state from introducing evidence of the 2007 DUI as a predicate
offense. (R., p.123.)
Gerst pleaded guilty to felony DUI but reserved the right to appeal from the
district court’s partial denial of his motion in limine. (R., pp.125, 136.) Gerst was
sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed, and placed on probation.
(R., pp.141-44.) He timely appeals. (R., pp.147-49.)

3

ISSUE

Gerst states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Gerst’s
motion in limine as to the enhancement issue?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gerst failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in
limine?
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ARGUMENT
Gerst Fails To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying His Motion In
Limine

A.

Introduction
The district court partially denied Gerst’s motion in limine seeking to prevent the

state from offering evidence of Gerst’s 2007 DUI conviction. (R., p.123.) The court
concluded that Gerst presented “no evidence that he was denied the right to counsel in the
Bannock County case,” and even assuming he did, “the evidence on the whole supports
the conclusion that [Gerst] wasn’t denied the right to counsel.” (R., p.123.) A review of
the record unmistakably supports this conclusion, as the record contains, among other
things, an express waiver of Gerst’s right to counsel. Gerst therefore fails to show the
district court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine so [Idaho’s

appellate courts] review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine
for abuse of discretion.” State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527, 328 P.3d 504, 507
(2014) (quoting Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 878, 204 P.3d 508, 518 (2009)). “A trial
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2)
acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason.” Id. “When a violation of a
constitutional right is asserted, [Idaho’s appellate courts] will accept the trial court’s
factual findings unless such findings are clearly erroneous,” but will freely review
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whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 613, 389 P.3d 155, 158 (2016) (citing State v. Stanfield,
158 Idaho 327, 331, 347 P.3d 175, 179 (2015)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Relied On Gerst’s Express Waiver Of Counsel When
It Determined He Failed To Show A Violation Of The Right To Counsel
A criminal defendant can only “collaterally attack prior convictions used for

sentencing enhancement purposes” by showing a denial of the right to counsel. FarfanGalvan, 161 Idaho at 614, 389 P.3d at 159 (quoting State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 94, 90
P.3d 314, 319 (2004)).

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right of self-

representation which derives from the Sixth Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 818 (1975). To validly waive the right to counsel the defendant must make a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 633-634,
167 P.3d 765, 770-771 (2007) (citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278,
289 (2003)). The State bears the burden to prove that the defendant voluntarily waived
his Sixth Amendment rights. Id.
While some jurisdictions have held that a specific warning from the trial court
concerning the dangers of self-representation is a prerequisite for a constitutionally valid
waiver of the right to counsel, others have held that Faretta requires only that the
defendants be aware of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, and that such awareness
sometimes can be discerned even in the absence of admonitions from the court. See State
v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 639-640, 97 P.3d 1025, 1028-1029 (Ct. App. 2004)
(summarizing relevant cases).

The United States Supreme Court has held that less

rigorous warnings regarding self-representation are required before trial than at trial,
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“because, at that stage, ‘the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation ... are
less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial.’” Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 90 (2004) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 289 (1988)).
When determining whether a waiver of the right to counsel was valid, Idaho
courts examine the totality of the circumstances. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 746,
170 P.3d 886, 889 (2007); see also Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 64, 90 P.3d at 289; State v.
King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998). An Idaho appellate court’s
determination of whether a waiver was valid is not limited to a review of the hearing at
which the waiver was made: “[t]he particular moment of the waiver is not the only
consideration; rather, the record as a whole is considered.” Anderson, 144 Idaho at 746747, 170 P.3d at 889-890; see also Dalrymple, 144 Idaho at 634, 167 P.3d at 771 (“While
contemporaneous Faretta warnings are perhaps the most prudent means to ensure the
defendant’s grasp of the disadvantages of self-representation, we look to the record as a
whole to determine if [appellant] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
constitutional right.” (citation omitted)).
The district court correctly concluded that “the evidence on the whole supports the
conclusion that [Gerst] wasn’t denied the right to counsel.” (R., p.123.) The 2007 DUI
case record shows Gerst signed a pre-trial stipulation indicating that his decision to plead
guilty was made with full knowledge of his constitutional rights, which he “WAIVES, …
including the right to counsel.” (R., p.92 (emphasis added); quoted at R., p.122.) The
record also contains Gerst’s judgement of conviction, in which checkboxes denote that
“DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS” were “explained by Court” and “advised at prior
proceeding”—including the right “[t]o counsel”—which was likewise checked “waived.”
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(R., p.96; see also R., p.122.) Gerst signed and dated the judgment. (R., p.96.) The
record therefore plainly supports the district court’s conclusion that Gerst knowingly
waived his right to counsel and chose to represent himself.
Gerst argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion. Citing to
Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho at 614, Gerst points out that a “waiver cannot be presumed
from a silent record.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) True. But that rule undoubtedly applied
in Farfan-Galvan, where this Court took pains to note that “[o]f particular significance to
this appeal, there is no indication in the record that Farfan-Galvan waived his right to
counsel.” 161 Idaho at 612, 389 P.3d at 157 (emphasis added). Because the record there
“did not contain any indication that Farfan-Galvan had waived the right to counsel in the
2010 case,” the conviction in that case could not “serve as the basis to enhance the charge
to a felony.” Id.
The “silent record” standard is inapplicable here because the record is not “silent”
in any recognizable sense of the word. Far from it: the record contains Gerst’s express
waiver of his right to counsel (along with the other evidence showing a valid waiver).
(R., pp.92, 96-97.) Thus, Gerst fails to show the district court erred by “presum[ing]” a
valid waiver “from a silent record.” The district court did the opposite—it properly relied
on information that is self-evident in the record.
A bit of scrutiny unravels Gerst’s other claim of error: he declares that the district
court abused its discretion because “every presumption must be made against a waiver of
the right to counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10 (emphasis added).) Gerst cites to Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), for this apparently unforgiving standard.
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But Gerst’s paraphrase of the rule lops off a key adjective. In actuality, Brewer
held that courts are required to “indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver.” 430 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). Applying the full standard shows that the
district court did not err—because no reasonable presumption could presume away a
waiver that is expressly set forth in the record. And it would be entirely unreasonable for
the district court to presume there was no waiver here, when, in fact, there was.
Gerst’s last-ditch claim is that “while the record indicates there may have been a
‘waiver,’ the record does not show it was knowing and intelligent.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.10.) This claim fails in light of the waiver, which states that “[i]f the Defendant signs
this document indicating he will PLEAD GUILTY, he hereby agrees that he does so with
the full knowledge of his constitutional and statutory rights, including the possible
consequences of said plea and that he WAIVES said rights, including the right to counsel,
if applicable.” (R., p.92 (emphasis added).)
Gerst quibbles with the “if applicable” appendage, claiming “there is nothing in
the record indicating that Mr. Gerst was ever informed of his right to counsel or the scope
of that right—so he could not have known if it was ‘applicable.’” (Appellant’s brief,
p.10.) First, this is contradicted by the waiver itself, because Gerst purported to have
“full knowledge of his constitutional and statutory rights.” (R., p.92.) “Full knowledge,”
by definition, would have included knowledge that the right to counsel was applicable.
Second, by parsing the waiver this finely, Gerst all but asks for a “Faretta-type
inquiry” to deconstruct it—a clause-by-clause, line-by-line inquiry into whether Gerst
actually understood what he said he understood. Idaho’s appellate courts, however, have
“explicitly rejected [the] contention that a Faretta-type inquiry is necessary in order for a
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waiver of the right to counsel to be valid.” Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 614 n.4, 389
P.3d 155, 159 n.4 (citing State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 509, 873 P.2d 150, 154 (1994)).
The district court therefore correctly noted that the lack of evidence of such a hearing
(and whatever facts it might have brought out), while “somewhat troubling,” was
nevertheless not required. (R., p.122 (citing Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 614 n.4, 389
P.3d 155, 159 n.4).) What was required was Gerst’s knowing waiver—which can be
found in the record, and which speaks for itself. (R,. p.92.)
The district court correctly concluded that based on the evidence in the record
Gerst waived his right to counsel. Gerst fails to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the partial denial of Gerst’s
motion in limine.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 10th day of September, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
KDG/dd
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